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Tennessee's Response to the Supreme Court's Decision
The Honorable Paul G. Summers & Ms. Elizabeth Martin'
I. General Summers:
The State of Tennessee has conceded from the
outset of the Lane2 litigation that the Americans with
Disabilities Act 3 applies to it and that its obligation to
comply with the ADA may be enforced by suits for
injunctive relief and attorneys' fees under Ex parte Young.
4
The only issue before the Supreme Court was whether or
not an individual could seek money damages from the State
for violations of the ADA. The Supreme Court held that
the State could be sued for damages in cases where a
violation of the constitutional right of access to the Courts
was proven. The State's vulnerability to damages claims in
other contexts remains an open question.
Because the State of Tennessee has always agreed
that it must comply with the ADA, the impact of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lane is of limited practical
significance. The State of Tennessee has, and continues, to
accommodate persons with disabilities and does not
discriminate against persons with disabilities. Of course,
Title II of the ADA is applicable to many other areas of
state government in addition to the judicial program. A
brief review of the cases filed against the State of
Tennessee before and after the Supreme Court's decision in
Lane reveals that there has not been an increase in the
number of cases filed in all areas under Title II. Indeed, the
number of cases alleging disability discrimination is not
disproportionate to the number of cases filed against the
Paul G. Summers is the Tennessee Attorney General & Reporter.
Elizabeth Martin is an Assistant Tennessee Attorney General.
2 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
4 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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State of Tennessee. That there has been no flood of
damages claims in the aftermath of Lane provides at least
circumstantial evidence for the proposition that the State's
record of compliance is adequate in most respects.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in
Tennessee v. Lane, the case was remanded to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. A
settlement was negotiated between the State and the
plaintiffs. The settlement did not provide for damages by
the State. It provided only for payment of attorneys' fees
and that the State would take particular actions regarding
access to the courts by disabled persons. As a practical
matter, this outcome is exactly what plaintiffs could have
obtained from the State had they sued under Ex parte
Young for injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. As part of
that settlement, and with input from plaintiffs and their
lawyers, a specific policy was adopted by the Tennessee
Supreme Court to make certain that the Americans with
Disabilities Act was followed with regard to state court
proceedings.
This policy applies to all parties and attorneys as
well as to court personnel. A copy of that policy is
provided. This policy does not add any additional
obligations on the State of Tennessee but provides a
process for insuring compliance with the ADA.
Because Tennessee's judicial program involves the
intersection of state and local governments, the policy is
significant in its attempt to address all issues. However, the
burden of compliance remains on the governmental entity
involved, for the most part, the counties. In addition, the
Administrative Office of the Courts has implemented a
training plan to insure that all judges-both state and
local-as well as their assistants and clerks of courts are
trained regarding the requirements of the Policy on Judicial
Access. An ADA coordinator for access to the judicial
program has been assigned for each county to assist
persons with disabilities. This training has already begun.
2
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Even before the commencement of the Lane case,
most state court judges were working diligently to provide
access to the courts for necessary parties. However, due to
the unique nature of Tennessee's judicial system, including
municipal, county and state courts and the use of county
courthouses for state judicial proceedings, the courts'
record of compliance was not always consistent. Most of
the issues raised by the Lane litigation did not involve
intentional discrimination.
In Tennessee, every county is required to provide a
courthouse. 5 However, there are no provisions for funding
by the state and no requirements related to the physical
facilities beyond the simple requirement that there be a
courthouse and that it be located within the city limits of
the county seat. 6 But there are no provisions of state law
allowing the state court judges to enforce the requirements
of the ADA against the counties. Because the ADA allows
local and state governments to use alternative locations
rather than make extensive renovations, the policy on
access to the judicial program allows relocation of judicial
programs in order to comply with the ADA. This is not
new, but is a clarification of the State's policy.
Many of the judges already used alternative
locations. A number of the counties have made plans to
renovate the courthouses or to build new courthouses or
justice centers. This should alleviate problems involving
access by individuals with disabilities as well.
The issue of alternative locations was a major issue
in Lane. Mr. Lane's factual allegations in his complaint
included a claim that he was offered an alternative location
and he refused. Mr. Lane argued that the ADA required the
State or County to provide an elevator with access to a
second floor courtroom. While Mr. Lane has been
successful in encouraging some counties to make physical
5 Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-7-104 (2005).
6 1d. § 577-105.
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changes to their courthouses, the State has not agreed to
provide or require physical changes if alternative locations
can be used. Another issue raised by Plaintiffs was the
State's requirement that a person with a disability needing
an accommodation give reasonable notice to the Court in
order to obtain the accommodation. Plaintiffs argued that
this requirement was discriminatory.
The State disagreed and the policy ultimately
agreed upon includes a notice requirement.
One positive outcome of the Lane lawsuit is that the
Administrative Office of the Courts has recommended that
Tennessee Code Annotated § 22-2-304 be amended.
Subsection (c) of that statute currently provides that the
names of all persons "known by the commissioners to have
died or removed from the county or to have become
mentally or physically disabled" drawn for jury service
"shall be put aside and not used, and another name or
names shall be drawn in its or their stead.",7  The
application of this statute was not raised by any of the
plaintiffs. However, pending legislation deletes the
requirement that the names of disabled persons be set aside
and has been passed by the House (96-0). It will likely be
approved by the Senate this legislative session.
Two statutes relating to jury duty remain on the
books. First, Tennessee Code Annotated § 22-1-102(b)
provides, "Persons not in the full possession of the senses
of hearing or seeing shall be excluded from service on any
jury if the court determines, of its own volition or on
motion of either party, that such person cannot provide
adequate service as a juror on such jury.'' This seems to
be consistent with the ADA. In addition, Tennessee Code
Annotated § 22-1-103 exempts certain persons and
professions from jury service. The exemption includes
7 Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-2-304(c) (2005).
8 Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-102(b) (2005).
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persons "disabled by bodily infirmity" 9 and "persons not in
the full possession of the senses of hearing or seeing."'
10
However, this exemption does not excuse or prevent
persons with disabilities from serving on a jury. It only
exempts the person from the initial summons and allows
the exempt person to choose the time frame for service.'l
This provision works well with the ADA Policy on Access
to the Judicial Program because the exemption allows the
prospective juror an opportunity to request any needed
accommodation and gives the Court the opportunity to
arrange for an accommodation such as an alternate location
or interpreter.
Another point to consider in assessing the impact of
Lane is to consider the impact of Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett12 throughout state
government. In Garrett, the Supreme Court held that
individuals could not bring claims for money damages
against the states for employment discrimination under
Title I of the ADA. Subsequent to Garrett, however, the
State of Tennessee continues to comply with the ADA in
the employment area. There is a written policy forbidding
disability discrimination in employment, an ADA
coordinator at each agency, and oversight by the Tennessee
Department of Personnel. Despite the fact that the State
has immunity from claims for money damages arising from
employment discrimination, the State continues to comply
with the ADA.
9 Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-103(a)(5) (2005).
'01 Id. § 22-1-103(a)(7).
" Id. § 22-1-103(c).
12 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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II. General Martin:
I will talk very briefly about the practical
implications of Lane for the State of Tennessee. As
General Summers pointed out, this case involved the
judiciary, not the executive branch. That is where the main
impact so far has been felt. We settled this case, and the
settlement resulted in our paying attorneys' fees, agreeing
to enter a policy that would address the issues of access to
the court, and providing training for the judges, clerks, and
the assistants to the court, to make sure the policy is
implemented. The policy that we implemented is
considered by a lot of people to be the blue ribbon policy.
There were not very many out there. The problem in the
judiciary is that it is a weird conjunction between states and
counties. The courthouses are county courthouses. The
Constitution in the State of Tennessee says the county has
to provide a courthouse. The State has state court, but state
court occurs in the courthouses supplied by the counties.
But the State has no authority to make the counties do
anything to their courthouses except have them. That puts
the State in an awkward position.
The Administrative Office of the Courts has
developed a policy that has been presented across the state.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has made this policy a
rule, which applies to every attorney. Attorneys have the
obligation to comply with the policy and make sure, if it is
necessary, that they raise it before the judge. Attorneys just
tell the judge they have a witness or plaintiff who needs to
be in court, and the judge must provide accommodations
under the rule. The rule is also applicable to a pro se
parties. If a pro se party knows they need special
accommodations, they have to ask for it.
Because of our unique position, some of the
courthouses are very old. They are on the national historic
register. They are impossible to renovate. There is simply
no way to put an elevator in. We were not in a position to
6
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ask the county to place elevators in their buildings. So we
arrange for alternative locations, clearly allowed by the
courts, with a little advanced notice. By allowing for
alternative locations, we believe we have complied with
Title II.
There are a few other policies which the State has
adopted. One, the Administrative Office of the Courts
submitted language to the legislature to change our jury
statute so disability is not taken into account in creating a
jury pool. That was not an issue in Lane, but it is a positive
outcome because it raised the bar.
While disability is no longer a factor for creating
juries, there is a statute which provides benefits for disabled
persons from serving on juries. The statute, which applies
to lawyers and doctors as well, allows people with
disabilities to choose one week during the year that they are
available to serve. This gives the court time to arrange an
alternative location or interpreter in order to accommodate
the person with a disability.
The statute also requires the judge to determine
whether the disabled person can serve as a juror. The
person's disability is only considered as it relates to the
specific case that the person has been called to sit on the
jury.
In 1999, I conducted one of the first training
sessions for the clerks of the courts. Throughout the time
that the ADA has been in effect, the State of Tennessee has
been attempting to train judges, clerks, general sessions
judges in how the ADA works. The State has also been
making sure our courts are accessible. That training is
continuing even now, and will continue for the next several
years in order to make certain that all the judges are aware,
and so our courts are, in fact, accessible to all persons
including those with disabilities.
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